SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton, Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope
to assist the legal community in keeping abreastof some of the more interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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EMPLOYMENT

LAW-STANDARD OF REVIEW-HOSPITAL DECISION TO TERMINATE PHYSICIAN'S STAFF PRIVILEGES NEED
ONLY BE SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT RELIABLE EVIDENCE-

Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hosp., 107 N.J. 240, 526
A.2d 697 (1987).
In 1979, Dr. Suketu H. Nanavati was granted staff privileges
as a cardiologist at the Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hospital. 107
NJ. at 244, 526 A.2d at 699. Dr. Nanavati subsequently became
involved in a dispute with Dr. Robert Sorensen, chief of cardiology, concerning the allocation of electrocardiogram (EKG) readings. Following Dr. Sorensen's denial of Dr. Nanavati's request
to read EKG's more than once a week, Dr. Nanavati began to
criticize Dr. Sorensen. Consequently, the hospital's medical staff
executive committee initiated proceedings to revoke Dr.
Nanavati's staff privileges, alleging that he was unable to work
harmoniously with other members of the hospital staff.
Dr. Nanavati filed suit in the New Jersey Superior Court,
Chancery Division, which held that the hospital proceedings had
been conducted improperly. Id. at 245, 526 A.2d at 699-700.
The court enjoined the revocation of Dr. Nanavati's privileges
and remanded the action to the hospital for further proceedings
consistent with the hospital bylaws. A newly appointed hearing
committee again recommended dismissal of Dr. Nanavati and the
hospital Board of Governors affirmed. Id. at 245, 526 A.2d at
700.
In 1983, Dr. Nanavati again brought suit in the chancery division, which held that the hearing committee's ex parte proceedings "violated fundamental fairness." Id. at 246, 526 A.2d at
700. The chancery division remanded the action to the hospital.
The chancery division determined after an independent review of
the hospital record that the proceedings were unfair by a "preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 247, 526 A.2d at 700. The
court stated that revocation of a physician's staff privileges on
grounds of disharmony must be supported by evidence "of actual
interference with patient care." Id. Concluding that such evidence was lacking, the chancery division permanently enjoined
the hospital from revoking Dr. Nanavati's staff privileges. The
appellate division affirmed the trial court's decision that the hospital proceedings were conducted improperly. The appellate division, however, held that the lower court "should not have made
independent findings of fact," but rather should have only deter-
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mined whether the decision of the hospital "was supported by
sufficient reliable evidence." Id.
The supreme court affirmed and modified the decision of the
appellate division and remanded the case to the hospital. Id. at
256, 562 A.2d at 705. Justice Pollock, writing for the court, held
that the decision of a hospital to revoke a doctor's staff privileges
must be supported by "sufficient reliable evidence." Id. at 249,
526 A.2d at 702. The court further held that while proof of actual patient harm is not needed to dismiss a disruptive physician,
a hospital should establish that "prospective disharmony probably will have an adverse impact on patient care." Id. at 254, 526
A.2d at 704 (quoting Sussman v. Overlook Hosp. Ass'n, 92 N.J.
Super. 163, 182, 222 A.2d 530, 540 (Ch. Div. 1966), aft'd, 95 N.J.
Super. 418, 231 A.2d 389 (App. Div. 1967)).
Justice Pollock first noted the well established, principle that
hospital decisions concerning staff privileges were subject to judicial review. Id. at 248, 526 A.2d at 701 (citing Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 396, 192 A.2d 817, 821 (1963)). The
justice explained, however, that in 1986 the court relaxed the
standard of judicial review regarding hospital decisions to grant
staff privileges. Id. As such, Justice Pollock stated that a court
"should sustain a hospital's standard for granting staff privileges
if that standard is rationally related to the delivery of health
care." Id. at 249, 526 A.2d at 701. While denial of privileges to a
new applicant is pejorative, the justice observed that revocation
of such privileges from an established physician was more devastating because of possible disruption of the operation of a hospital. Id. at 250, 526 A.2d at 702. Despite this distinction, Justice
Pollock held that a court should employ the same level ofjudicial
review. Id.
The court's deference to hospital decisions concerning staff
privileges was predicated on several factors. Id. at 250, 526 A.2d
at 702. Justice Pollock noted that hospitals utilize established
procedures to insure that such decisions are made fairly. Id. at
250-51, 526 A.2d at 702. Additionally, he recognized that hospitals are subject to extensive regulation. Id. at 251, 526 A.2d at
702. Finally, Justice Pollock acknowledged that a unique expertise is required in both hospital administration and medical treatment. Id. The justice observed that, unlike other corporations
hospitals are "vitally affected with a public interest and regularly
function in a crisis atmosphere." Id. at 252, 526 A.2d at 703.
Justice Pollock thus concluded that the cooperation among staff
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members was essential to the efficient functioning of a hospital,
and promotion of such cooperation was best left to those who
govern the hospital. Id. Justice Pollock cautioned, however, that
the court's deference to hospital decision-making was not a license to terminate or deny staff privileges based upon a physician's color, gender, race or religion. Id. at 253, 526 A.2d at 703.
Nor should a doctor be punished, he added, for constructively
criticizing other doctors or hospital procedures. Id., at 253, 526
A.2d at 703-04.
Justice Pollock next considered the justification for terminating a physician's staff privileges. Id. at 253, 526 A.2d at 704. He
stated that actual interference with patient care was sufficient
grounds for revoking a doctor's privileges. Id. Justice Pollock
added that disharmony, absent actual patient harm, could be
grounds for terminating staff privileges if evidence of specific incidents of misbehavior were presented and the hospital could
demonstrate that potential disharmony was likely to interfere
with health care. Id. at 254, 526 A.2d at 704.
The Nanavati decision illustrates the deference that New
Jersey courts have afforded hospitals when reviewing their decisions regarding staff privileges. In deferring to the judgment of a
hospital with respect to its day-to-day operations, the court recognized that such decisions are beyond their expertise. Nonetheless, in adopting the sufficient reliable evidence standard of
review, the Nanavati court has insured that hospitals are afforded
greater latitude in their daily operations, while guarding against
abuses that could jeopardize the public's need for quality health
care.
Richard Mongelli

PRODUCTS LIABILITY-DEFENSE

OF CONTRIBUTORY

NEGLI-

GENCE IS NOT CONTINGENT UPON WHETHER A PRODUCT WAS

PURPOSE-Rivera v. Westinghouse Elevator Co., 107 N.J. 256, 526 A.2d 705 (1987).
USED FOR ITS INTENDED

On January 19, 1981, Jose Rivera, an employee of City Federal Savings and Loan, was a member of a work crew organized
to move an eight foot conference table from one floor to another.
107 N.J. at 258, 526 A.2d at 706. As had been past work practice,
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the crew used the elevator top for this task, planning to control
its motion manually. The workers, however, were unaware that
the control mechanism had been left in the automatic operating
mode. Consequently, Rivera, who was on top of the elevator,
was killed instantly when it was activated by someone on a higher
floor.
Rivera's spouse brought suit against Westinghouse Elevator
Company (Westinghouse) alleging negligent failure to warn of
the risks associated with untrained use of an elevator top. At
trial, the court instructed the jury that Rivera was contributorily
negligent if "he had not acted as a reasonably prudent person
under the circumstances." Id. at 259, 526 A.2d at 706. Despite
the charge, the jury found Westinghouse wholly liable without
any contributory negligence on the part of Rivera and awarded
$150,000 in damages.
The appellate division reversed and remanded the case for a
new trial. Specifically, the court concluded that allocation of
100% liability to the defendant was "against the weight of evidence." Both the trial and appellate courts assumed that the applicable standard regarding contributory negligence was
negligence "arising from mere carelessness or inadvertence." Id.
at 259, 526 A.2d at 707. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in a
per curiam opinion, affirmed the decision of the appellate division insofar as it was premised upon an improper apportionment
of liability. Id.
The supreme court noted, however, that some confusion
with respect to the defense of contributory negligence might
arise from a footnote in the appellate division's opinion. Id. The
footnote suggested that the availability of the defense depended
upon whether a product was used in an unintended manner. Id.
at 259-60, 526 A.2d at 707 (citing Rivera, 209 N.J. Super. 543,
549 n.1, 508 A.2d 264, 267 n.1 (App. Div. 1986)). The court
inferred that the appellate division had assumed that the contributory negligence defense would have been unavailable had Rivera been using the elevator for its intended purpose. Id. at 260,
526 A.2d at 707.
The supreme court determined that the appellate division
"placed improper emphasis upon the relevance of the intended
or unintended use of a product." Id. The court stated that, as a
matter of law, the unintended use of a product is not a defense to
strict liability because liability may still exist if the use is foreseeable. Id. The court also observed that whether an unintended

212

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 18:206

use of a product constitutes contributory negligence is a question
of fact, not law. Id. Therefore, the court held that the issue of
whether Rivera's use of the elevator was unintended by the manufacturer was not determinative of the availability of the contributory negligence defense. Id.
The court stated that it was uncertain whether the appellate
division would have held "contributory negligence in its ordinary
sense" to be applicable had it not given undue consideration to
the question of Rivera's unintended use. Id. The court noted
certain situations involving workplace injuries due to defective
products where contributory negligence was not an available defense. Id. The court contended that in such instances the plaintiff's misconduct would have to rise to a level more serious than a
departure from a standard of reasonable care in order to be
deemed contributorily negligent. Id. at 260-61, 526 A.2d at 707.
The court declined, however, to decide both the proper standard
of care and the availability of the contributory negligence defense, as those issues had not been fully presented. Id. at 261,
526 A.2d at 708. Instead, the court directed that the matter be
addressed by the trial court. Id.
The Rivera court concluded correctly that the availability of
the contributory negligence defense in a product liability action
should turn on foreseeability of use and not whether a particular
use is deemed "unintended" as a matter of law. To hold otherwise would create an unbending and perhaps artificial standard.
Such decisions must, for the sake of fairness, be decided on a
case-by-case basis and should not be taken away from the trier of
fact.
Marybeth Scriven

REMEDIES-DAMAGES-OWNER OF AUTOMOBILE DAMAGED BY
TORTIous ACTS OF ANOTHER NEED NOT RENT SUBSTITUTE
VEHICLE AS PREREQUISITE TO RECOVERY FOR Loss OF USE-

Camaraza v. Bellavia Buick Corp., 216 N.J. Super. 263, 523
A.2d 669 (App. Div. 1987).
Ramiro Camaraza's car, while in the custody of Bellavia Buick Corporation (Bellavia) for servicing, was stolen by a third
party and damaged in an accident. 216 NJ. Super. at 265, 266,
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523 A.2d at 670. Camaraza was without the use of his automobile for five months while it was being repaired. He brought suit
against Bellavia for negligent care of his automobile.
The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment, but limited damages to the plaintiff's collision deductible as stipulated in his insurance policy. Id. at 265, 523 A.2d at
671. Refusing to grant a remedy for hypothetical losses, the
lower court held that Camaraza could not recover "for loss of use
of his automobile" because he had not rented a substitute vehicle. Id. at 265-66, 523 A.2d at 671. The appellate division reversed the damages portion of the judgment and remanded the
case for further proceedings. Id. at 269, 523 A.2d at 672. The
appellate division concluded that a plaintiff need not rent substitute transportation as a prerequisite to recovery for the "loss of
use" of his vehicle. Id. at 267, 523 A.2d at 671.
Judge Skillman, writing for the appellate division, stated that
recovery for property damages is not limited to "pecuniary losses
which are capable of precise measurement." Id. at 266, 523 A.2d
at 671. He noted that as a general rule all damages naturally and
proximately caused by a tort are recoverable. Id. The judge
opined that a plaintiff may be inconvenienced by the need to take
public transportation or the curtailment of certain activities because of the unavailability of his car. Id. at 267, 523 A.2d at 67172. Therefore, the court held that any substantial inconvenience
as a result of loss of use of a vehicle was compensable. Id. at 267,
523 A.2d at 672.
The court next addressed the appropriate measure of damages when a plaintiff does not rent a substitute vehicle. Id. at
268, 523 A.2d at 672. Judge Skillman observed that while the
approximate rental value of a substitute vehicle should be admitted into evidence, it was not determinative of the amount of recovery. Id. The court held that the appropriate remedy should
be made on a case by case basis with consideration given to a
plaintiff's individual circumstances. Id.
The Camaraza holding stands for the proposition that an individual need not demonstrate out-of-pocket expenses to recover
damages he may have sustained as a result of the loss of use of
his vehicle. Although the court was willing to allow damages for
"loss of use" of an automobile, it provided little guidance regarding what constitutes an -inconvenience" due to such loss, and
what damages would be an appropriate remedy. Consequently, a
dramatic increase in litigation is likely due to the difficulties in
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discerning real from feigned inconveniences. Additionally, the
court's failure to establish guidelines for an appropriate remedy
will result in mercenary individuals attempting to obtain windfall
damages.
John E. Bruder

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-HEARSAY NEED NOT BE SUPPORTED
BY

COMPETENT

EVIDENCE

IN

EXCLUSIONARY

PROCEEDINGS

AcT-Dep't of Law and
Pub. Safety, Div. of Gaming Enforcement v. Merlino, 216 N.J.
PURSUANT TO THE CASINO CONTROL

Super. 579, 524 A.2d 821 (App. Div. 1987).
In 1982, the Division of Gaming Enforcement (Division) petitioned the Casino Control Commission (Commission) to bar
the admittance of Philip Leonetti and Lawrence Merlino from the
state's licensed casinos. 216 N.J. Super. at 582, 524 A.2d at 82223. Both men were reputed crime figures and "associates" of
members of organized crime. Id. at 582, 524 A.2d at 823. The
Division alleged that the presence of Leonetti and Merlino in licensed casinos would be "inimical to the interests of the State of
New Jersey and to licensed gaming." Id. Therefore, the Division
sought to have both men placed on an exclusion list pursuant to
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-71 (West Supp. 1987). See id.

In 1983, the first of two hearings before an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) was held. The ALJ held in favor of the defendants, ruling that the hearsay evidence upon which the Division
relied was inadequate to support the exclusion of Leonetti and
Merlino from licensed casinos. The judge noted that the residuum rule requires that "hearsay evidence be supported by competent evidence." Id.
On May 1, 1984, the Commission issued an order rejecting
the ALJ's decision and remanded the matter for a new hearing

with instructions that compliance with the residuum rule was not
mandatory. On remand, the Commission introduced new evidence that Leonetti had been indicted as a "leading associate in
an organized crime cartel and [as] being responsible for the efforts of that cartel to control and influence the government of
Atlantic City." Id. at 583, 524 A.2d at 823. The ALJ held that
Leonetti should be placed on the Commission's exclusion list

1988]

SURVEYS

215

pending the outcome of the criminal charges against him. The
judge, however, denied the petition seeking to exclude Merlino.
In November 1985, the Commission again issued a decision
excluding both Leonetti and Merlino from the state's licensed
casinos. The Commission determined that the ALJ erred in applying the residuum rule which applied to administrative proceedings, not to Casino Control Act proceedings. Additionally,
the Commission concluded that adverse inferences may be drawn
from the defendants' assertion of their fifth amendment privilege
at an administrative hearing.
In March 1986, the defendants appealed the Commission's
order to the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division. Id.
at 581, 524 A.2d at 822. The appellate division affirmed the decision of the Commission to include the defendants' names on an
exclusionary list. Id. at 584, 524 A.2d at 824. Writing for the
court, Judge Scalera held that hearsay need not be supported by
competent evidence in exclusion proceedings. Id. at 585, 524
A.2d at 824. The court agreed with the Commission that pursuant to the Casino Control Act, the Commission was not "restricted by the requirements imposed on other administrative
agencies." Id. Thus, the court determined that the residuum rule
was inapplicable to proceedings before the Commission. Id.
The court next addressed the constitutionality of the exclusion statute. Id. The defendants contended that the language of
the Act was vague and indefinite, particularly with regard to the
inimical" standard. Id. The court noted that the "inimical" test
had successfully withstood similar constitutional attacks. Id. The
court observed that such attacks could be successful only if the
statute's language was so obscure that its meaning could be deduced only by conjecture. Id. at 586, 524 A.2d at 825. The court
held that the plain language of the statute clearly applied to the
defendants. Id.
Additionally, the court dismissed the defendants' argument
that the exclusion statute did not explicitly authorize the Commission's use of the "associates of career offenders" classification. Id. The court observed that the statute's plain language
implied that the list of persons subject to exclusion was not exclusive. Id. at 586-87, 524 A.2d at 825. Therefore, the court asserted that the Commission was empowered to include additional
classifications to the statutory list of excludable persons. Id.
Finally, the court rejected the defendants' claim that adverse
inferences could not be drawn from the assertion of the fifth
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amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 587, 524
A.2d at 825. The court observed that the defendants had a right
to invoke the privilege but that adverse inferences may be drawn
in administrative proceedings when there is additional evidence
to support such a finding. Id. Furthermore, the court emphasized that the penalty barring the defendants from gambling casinos was "relatively insubstantial." Id. at 587, 524 A.2d at 826.
Undoubtedly, some will express earnest concern that the
Merlino decision will make individuals potential targets for arbitrary state action. Such concern must be viewed in its proper
perspective, however. Fundamental rights are not at issue. Legalized gaming is and must remain a tightly controlled, heavily
regulated industry to insure its legitimacy. The plethora of laws
governing licensed gambling evidences the concern of the state.
In this regard, the Merlino decision advances the legislative intent
of the Casino Control Act.
Judy A. Verrone

ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW-RoOMING

AND

BOARDING

HOUSE

ACT-THE ROOMING AND BOARDING HOUSE ACT IS INAPPLICABLE TO NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS-Market St. Mission v.

Bureau of Rooming and Boarding House Standards, 217 NJ.

Super. 56, 524 A.2d 1283 (App. Div. 1987).
The Market Street Mission (Mission) was a non-profit, religious corporation that provided free food, clothing, shelter and
rehabilitative programs to individuals recovering from alcohol or
drug dependency. 217 NJ. Super. at 59-60, 524 A.2d at 128485. In January 1984, pursuant to the Rooming and Boarding
House Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 55:13B-1 to -17 (West 1979) (Act),

the Bureau of Rooming and Boarding House Standards (Bureau)
inspected the Mission and found numerous safety violations. Id.
at 58, 524 A.2d at 1284. Although the Bureau Commissioner
had ordered that the violations be rectified, the Bureau discovered upon reinspection that the violations had not been corrected. Consequently, the Commissioner assessed monetary
penalties in the amount of $3,050.
The Mission challenged both the Bureau's jurisdiction and
the applicability of the Act to a non-profit, religious corporation.
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Id. at 59, 524 A.2d at 1284. On administrative appeal, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held that the Act applied to the
Mission and that the penalties assessed by the Bureau were reasonable. The Commissioner affirmed the ALJ's opinion, but
agreed to waive the penalties provided that the Mission abated
the safety violations.
The Mission found the Commissioner's requirements unacceptable and appealed the decision. The appellate division reversed the Commissioner's determination and vacated the
penalties. Id. at 72, 524 A.2d at 1291. The appellate court held
that the act applied solely to commercial enterprises and did not
control the Mission's activities. Id. at 68, 524 A.2d at 1289.
Writing for the appellate division, Judge Deighan emphasized that "[i]n interpreting a statute, primary regard must be
given to the fundamental purpose for which the legislation was
enacted." Id. at 65, 524 A.2d at 1287 (citing New Jersey Builders,
Owners & Managers Ass'n v. Blair, 60 N.J. 330, 338, 288 A.2d 855,

859 (1972)). Judge Deighan further noted that the spirit of the
law controls the letter of the law when a literal reading of a statute would lead to a result at variance with the statute's essential
design and purpose. Id. As such, the judge averred that the
meaning of a statute should "be gathered from the object and
nature of the subject matter, the contextual setting, and the mischief sought to be eliminated as well as the proposed remedy."
Id. (citing Brewer v. Porch, 53 N.J. 167, 249 A.2d 388 (1969); SanLan Builders, Inc. v. Baxendale, 28 N.J. 148, 145 A.2d 457 (1958)).

Applying these principles of construction, Judge Deighan
recognized that the intention of the Act was to provide "for the
health, safety and welfare of persons residing in rooming and
boarding houses." Id. at 66, 524 A.2d at 1288 (quoting NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 55:13B-2 (West 1979)). Additionally, he observed
that the Act was concerned with the protection and encouragement of the boarding home industry. Id. at 62, 524 A.2d at 1286.
Finally, Judge Deighan recognized that these goals were supplemented by the Boarding Facility's Bill of Rights, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 55:13B-18 to -21 (West Supp. 1987), which protects the rights
of all rooming and boarding house residents. Id. at 63, 524 A.2d
at 1286.
Judge Deighan concluded that the regulations promulgated
by the Commissioner pursuant to the Act covered numerous areas which were either inapplicable to or incompatible with the
Mission's purpose. Id. at 69, 524 A.2d at 1289. He noted that
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many of the mandates were concerned with the orderly operation
of a profit-making business, as opposed to a charitable institution. Id. at 70, 524 A.2d at 1290. Other standards, the judge
stated, were enacted to protect the dignity and rights of a boarding house occupant. Id. Judge Deighan observed that such standards were unnecessary to the regulation of an organization,
such as the Mission, whose intention was to promote and develop
human dignity. Id. at 70-71, 524 A.2d at 1290. Thus, the court
held that the Act was inapplicable to non-profit organizations.
Id. at 68, 524 A.2d at 1289.
The Market St. Mission opinion demonstrates the importance
of a reasoned statutory analysis. Statutory applications based
upon literal readings without regard to legislative intent may
frustrate rather than facilitate a statute's remedial purpose. Here,
application of the Act to the Mission would not have advanced
the Act's goal of providing for the welfare of boarding house residents; indeed, adherence to the Act would have been costly and
would have discouraged the Mission from offering care to those
in need of its help. Therefore, where a literal reading of a statute
may produce unintended results, courts should not be hesitant to
look beyond a statute's plain language in order to effectuate the
legislature's intent and avoid unjust results.
Robin A. Newman

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SEARCH

AND

SEIZURE-EVIDENCE

LAWFULLY SEIZED UNDER FEDERAL LAW IS
STATE

COURT

PROSECUTION

IF

DANT'S STATE CONSTITUTIONAL

SEIZURE

INADMISSIBLE IN
VIOLATES

DEFEN-

RIGHTS-State v. Mollica, 217

N.J. Super. 95, 524 A.2d 1303 (App. Div. 1987).
Primo Mollica and Augustine Ferrone were indicted for possession of gambling records and promoting gambling. See 217
N.J. Super. 95, 524 A.2d 1303. At trial, the judge determined
that the telephone toll billing records, upon which probable
cause was based, were acquired pursuant to an independent federal investigation and were subsequently provided to state authorities. Id. at 96, 524 A.2d at 1304. The trial judge determined
that the toll records had been the product of an illegal search and
seizure in violation of the NewJersey Constitution. Id. at 97, 524
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A.2d at 1304. Thus, he concluded that the warrant issued was
invalid and ordered the evidence seized pursuant to it
suppressed.
The State appealed to the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division. See id. The appellate division affirmed the lower
court's decision. Judge Antell, writing for the court, held that
evidence lawfully seized under federal law by independent federal authorities was inadmissible in a state court prosecution if
seizure was in violation of the defendants' state constitutional
rights. Id. at 100, 525 A.2d at 1305-06.
The court first noted that the seizure of telephone toll
records did not violate the fourth amendment. Id. at 97, 524
A.2d at 1304. Thus, the court acknowledged that the records
would be admissible in a federal prosecution. Id. at 98, 524 A.2d
at 1305. Judge Antell observed, however, that New Jersey courts
had "frequently resorted to our own State Constitution in order
to afford our citizens broader protection of certain personal
rights than that afforded by analogous or identical provisions of
the federal Constitution." Id. at 97, 524 A.2d at 1304 (quoting
State v. Novembrino, 105 NJ. 95, 145, 519 A.2d 820, 849 (1987)).
On this basis, the court held that the more stringent state law
standard should be applied to protect the defendants' constitutional right to privacy. See id. at 98, 524 A.2d at 1304.
The court distinguished People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 602
P.2d 738, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1979), from the case at bar. Mollica,
217 N.J. Super. at 98-99, 524 A.2d at 1305. In Blair, the California Supreme Court held that a legal seizure of toll records by
federal authorities in Pennsylvania were admissible in a California proceeding despite that such a seizure would be illegal in California. Id. at 98, 524 A.2d at 1305. The Mollica court stated
that, unlike the present case, the Blair defendant's "expectation
of privacy was not impaired under the laws of the state in which
he resided." Id. at 99, 524 A.2d at 1305 (quoting Blair, 25 Cal.
3d at 656, 602 P.2d at 748, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 828).
Finally, the court reasoned that the application of the exclusionary rule in the matter at issue was consistent with federal case
law. See id. at 100, 524 A.2d at 1306. The court observed that in
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), evidence seized by
state officials pursuant to state law, but in violation of the United
States Constitution, was suppressed in a federal prosecution. Id.
Thus, the court opined that evidence seized in violation of the
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New Jersey Constitution must be suppressed in a state proceeding. See id. at 101, 524 A.2d at 1306.
The appellate division recognized that the New Jersey Constitution affords broader protection of privacy rights than the
federal Constitution. The purpose of insuring greater protection
from unreasonable search and seizure would be eviscerated if
state officials could circumvent New Jersey's constitutional standards by obtaining evidence from federal authorities who were
not bound by the same stringent standards. The Mollica decision
will insure that New Jersey's higher standards of privacy protection are met in state prosecutions, regardless of federal involvement in such matters.
Madeline E. Cox

